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SAVING ORIGINALISM
Robert J. Delahunty*
John Yoo**
America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and
Principles We Live By. By Akhil Reed Amar. New York: Basic
Books. 2012. Pp. xvi, 483. $29.99.
Introduction
It is sometimes said that biographers cannot help but come to admire,
even love, their subjects. And that adage seems to ring true of Professor
Amar,1 the foremost “biographer” of the Constitution. He loves it not just as
a governing structure, or a political system, but as a document. He loves the
Constitution in the same way that a fan of English literature might treasure
Milton’s Paradise Lost or Shakespeare’s Macbeth. He loves the Constitution
not just for the good: the separation of powers, federalism, and the Bill of
Rights. He also loves it for its nooks and crannies, idiosyncrasies, funny
phrasing, and odd language.
Amar’s earlier book, America’s Constitution: A Biography,2 displayed his
contagious enthusiasm for the Constitution and its history. Postmodern theories, the Frankfurt School, or economic determinism did not make an appearance in his holistic interpretation of the Constitution. But like many a
biographer, Amar cannot admire his subject if it has great faults. Some biographers fail because their admiration overwhelms their objectivity, and they
tend to minimize or ignore serious personal flaws. Amar, however, is too
honest to ignore his subject’s blemishes. He is faced with the quandary of an
imperfect Constitution.
His answer is to bend, pull, and stretch the original into a better form—
a constitutional photoshop for the twenty-first century. Amar appears to get
cold feet in the face of “the unhappy truth that not every problem was
meant to be solved by the United States Constitution, nor can be.”3 Readers
must judge whether his quest for perfection has overwritten, if not erased,
the original image. In this sequel, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The
* Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
** Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of
Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. We thank Michael Paulsen for his
comments on the manuscript and Daniel Chen and Riddhi Dasgupta for excellent research
assistance.
1. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (2005).
3. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 n.* (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Henry
P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981)).
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Precedents and Principles We Live By, Amar tries to save the object of his
affection from the success of Biography.
Amar’s method, however, yields conclusions that many leading constitutional law scholars would find unacceptable. Under a strict originalist approach, the Fourteenth Amendment does not appear to prohibit segregation
by gender. Critics like David Strauss argue that originalism would permit
racial segregation by the federal government, and perhaps by the states too,
and would not have incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states.4 An
original Constitution might not provide for a right to privacy or recognize a
woman’s right to an abortion. It could reject parts of the large federal administrative state in areas such as the environment and labor, and it could
restrict the scope of freedom of speech, including core political speech. It
may well be that textualism and originalism, properly applied, do not produce these outcomes, but most constitutional law scholars appear to believe
that the framers’ Constitution is doomed by these interpretive methods.
Amar loves the Constitution so much that he cannot allow it to suffer
what he sees as crippling, perhaps mortal, flaws such as these. But Amar has
a tool that does not lay in the kit of a normal biographer. Faced with serious
faults in his subject, Amar corrects them. His remedy is to invent an unwritten Constitution that sits beside the written text. While he cautions that his
unwritten Constitution “supplements but does not supplant” the written
one (p. 273), he also admits that a “particular unwritten rule or principle
[can] form[ ] part of America’s Constitution—and is thus roughly on a par
with or somehow akin to the canonical text” (p. 479). “America’s unwritten
Constitution and America’s written Constitution fit together to form a single system” (p. 479). Although Amar would not describe it as such, the unwritten Constitution functions to cure virtually every supposed
imperfection in the written version. And this simply cannot be right. As one
of Amar’s most penetrating critics has rightly said, “[t]he Constitution is not
an unwritten vessel into which to pour the objects of one’s interpretive
desires. And it is on precisely this score that America’s Unwritten Constitution is most deeply and seriously flawed.”5
In this Review of Unwritten, we will make three points. First, we will
describe Amar’s method in revealing an unwritten Constitution. We will use
women’s rights as an example of a gap in the written Constitution that
Amar corrects with a variety of sources. While we agree with his results as a
matter of policy, we argue that, without the originalism of Biography, Unwritten contains no consistent limits on its sources and methods. Second, we
delve deeper into the history of originalism as an interpretive method to
4. David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 12–15 (2010).
5. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So Help
Me God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1385, 1415 (2014)
(reviewing America’s Unwritten Constitution); see also David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten, After
All?, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1550 (2013) (reviewing America’s Unwritten Constitution) (“If
you believe that the only true source of constitutional law is the written Constitution—but
you want to accept American constitutional law in something like its present shape—then
Amar will show you how to do it.”).
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show that it is not as flawed, perhaps, as Amar might think. While it arguably might have been conceived as a response to judicial activism of the Warren Court era, originalism has evolved into a sophisticated approach to
constitutional interpretation that does not advance any particular political
ideology. Third, we take up the question of instrumental or consequentialist
reasons for originalism. We use bargaining theory to explain why originalism could have served as an important aid to the formation and continuation of the Union.
I. Unwritten’s Search for the Perfect Constitution
The unwritten Constitution would be unnecessary if Amar did not find
the results of originalism so unsatisfyingly desiccated. To be sure, there are
plenty of areas where Amar need not find a conflict between the original
Constitution and good policy. In his view, for example, those who drafted
and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did not clearly preclude “separate
but equal” segregation. But Amar finds that the unwritten Constitution—
composed in part of the “words and deeds” of segregationists in the 1860s—
shows no “gloss” on the Fourteenth Amendment’s text that segregation was
permissible (pp. 147–48). But, strictly speaking, Amar did not need to resort
to a claim of an unwritten Constitution on this score. A reading of the plain
text of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses, and the principles that the Reconstruction-era framers
had in mind, would have supported the idea of a color-blind Constitution.
In fact, Amar has contributed much to the literature seeking to recover the
original understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments,6 which does not
support the Supreme Court’s mistakes in Plessy v. Ferguson7 and the Slaughter-House Cases.8
It is the question of women’s rights that shows the lengths to which
Amar will go to save desirable, modern values from originalist outcomes.
The written Constitution’s explicit protection for women’s rights appears
only in the Nineteenth Amendment’s guarantee of women’s right to vote.
The 1972 Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”), moreover, fell short of ratification, failing to acquire the necessary approval of three-quarters of the
states. But Amar finds an unwritten “Feminist Constitution” that adopted
the substance of the ERA anyway (pp. 295–96). “This broad popular support
was entitled to interpretive weight as a popular gloss on the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Ninth Amendment, in keeping with the principles of
America’s lived Constitution” (p. 296). A majority of Americans may have
supported the ERA, as Congress voted by the required two-thirds margin to
send the amendment to the states. But the states failed to ratify it, which
should indicate that the nation chose not to incorporate full gender equality
6.
137–214
7.
8.

See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction
(1998).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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in the constitutional text. Rather, the American people chose to continue to
protect women’s rights by statute in such laws as Titles VII and IX of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Amar, however, concludes that “the ERA itself was
a largely declaratory proposal—a restatement and elaboration” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equality (p. 296).
If this is true, of course, why bother with a constitutional amendment at
all? Amar’s approach confers on judges the license to conjure amendments
to the Constitution based on perceived political and social movements but
without any change to the text. Only the People can amend the text. That
time-consuming process might strike some as much too cumbersome and
unreliably plebeian as far as the scope and direction of the project are concerned. The ideas proposed by those movements may temporarily command
majority support, but if they cannot survive the rigorous steps demanded by
the Article V amendment process, they cannot assume the status of constitutional law. Even if one were to accept that political movements can supplement but not supplant constitutional meaning, how are judges to discern
which principles qualify for constitutional establishment and which should
seek their fates in the normal legislative process? It may be comforting that
in some cases such movements lead to broader rights and greater equality,
but widespread popular support has also coalesced around principles that
Amar surely would not endorse. Racial segregation received majority support between Reconstruction and the 1950s, if the laws enacted by Congress
and opinions of the Supreme Court are any sign at all. To illustrate, in 1875,
the Blaine Amendment capitalized on anti-Catholic feeling in the country to
try to prohibit any public aid for religious institutions, especially schools.9
Although the amendment passed the House and fell short by four votes in
the Senate, twenty-one states added such provisions to their constitutions
while seventeen already had them.10 Interracial marriage was widely disfavored, and legal bans on it were not struck down until 1967.11 Under Amar’s
approach, judges of the era could have found the unwritten Constitution to
allow “separate but equal”-style racial segregation, to prohibit miscegenation, or to restrict the rights of religious minorities. We are sure Amar would
not support any of these outcomes. Nor would we. But we cannot tell what
separates these results from others in Unwritten, once it opens the Pandora’s
box of social movements as proxies for constitutional meaning.
Correcting originalism’s perceived shortcomings forces Amar to turn
ever more intricate interpretive somersaults. Let’s return to the question of
women’s rights. Conventional defenses of Roe v. Wade rely on a right to
privacy, sexual freedom, autonomy, or gender equality recognized by the

9. See Steven K. Green, The Second Disestablishment: Church and State in
Nineteenth-Century America 294–302 (2010).
10. Steven K. Green, The Bible, the School, and the Constitution: The Clash
that Shaped Modern Church-State Doctrine 230 (2012).
11. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

April 2015]

Saving Originalism

1085

Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.12 Nevertheless, the right to an
abortion has deeply troubled many leading constitutional law scholars, even
liberal ones, for its lack of textual roots and its weak theory of substantive
due process rights.13 Amar, however, suggests that the right to an abortion
emerges from the unwritten Feminist Constitution that complements the
Nineteenth Amendment (pp. 291–92). He argues that laws burdening
women enacted before the Nineteenth Amendment became illegitimate because no women had voted for them (pp. 291–92). This does not just include laws prohibiting women from voting, holding office, or serving on
juries, but any law that imposed “special burdens” on women (p. 292). “As
for these laws, perhaps judges should have wiped the legal slate clean in
1920, by striking down the old laws and thereby obliging states to put the
matter to a fresh vote” (p. 292; emphasis omitted). But it is unclear why only
laws that impose “special burdens” on women should have been invalidated
(not to mention the problem of defining a “special burden”). If women did
not participate in the electoral process before the Nineteenth Amendment,
they should not have had to live under any laws that were passed in the preamendment period. Furthermore, there is no reason whatsoever why the
supreme law of the land—the Constitution itself—should be exempted from
this deducible rule. Sparked by the Nineteenth Amendment, Amar’s unwritten Feminist Constitution subverts the decisions of the Constitutional Convention, the state ratifying conventions, the Reconstruction Congress, and
every Congress and state legislature between the American Revolution and
1920.
An obvious problem in Amar’s Feminist Constitution arises here. Legislatures elected after the Nineteenth Amendment have enacted many restrictions on abortion. Pennsylvania, for example, enacted the Abortion Control
Act, which was struck down in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey in
1992.14 Polls apparently show that a plurality of the nation considers itself
pro-life rather than pro-choice.15 This seems to undermine a key premise in
Amar’s “special-burdens” thesis. American women’s political consciences
are not monolithic toward policies generally or those that impose “special
burdens” on them. This ploy deprives women of their individual political
agency.16
12. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985).
13. The most well-known example being John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973).
14. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
15. E.g., Karlyn Bowman & Jennifer Marsico, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy
Research, AEI Public Opinion Studies: Attitudes About Abortion 43 (2014), available
at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/-attitudes-about-abortion-an-aei-publicopinion-study_165237903059.pdf (reporting that, in a May 2013 Gallup poll, 48 percent of
respondents identified as pro-life and 45 percent identified as pro-choice).
16. There is no warrant to presuppose that women, just by virtue of being women, have
certain views on any policies. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,
268–70 (1993).
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Even if one were to accept Amar’s broad claim about pre-1920 laws, his
argument would support abortion limits enacted in the years since. Amar
then switches ground from constitutional language to unwritten rule to argue that contemporary restrictions on abortion violated the Constitution by
preventing women from fully participating in the political process (p. 292).
Again, Amar faces the difficulty of identifying the source of this principle
and why it does not extend to other groups or rights. Should we consider
any difference in the government’s treatment of any group unconstitutional,
because such treatment might inhibit that group’s participation in politics?
If we include gender, and perhaps sexual orientation, why not also constitutionalize protections for social class and economic status, immigration status, prior conviction for a felony, or even appearance, intelligence, or
physical ability? Why stop with women’s rights?
Amar’s difficulty in answering these questions shows in his literary
treatment of the issue. At this point in Unwritten, Amar resorts to a hypothetical conversation between Adam, a constitutional scholar from the
1950s, and Eve, a present-day professor “familiar with avant-garde feminist
theories” (p. 297). The dialogue is an unusual mix of abstract constitutional
theories (Adam begins with “how exactly does a constitutional norm of sexequality prohibit laws designed to protect the innocent human life of male
and female babies alike?”) and imagined contemporary lingo (Eve responds,
in one exchange, with “A cute point—but again, please get real.”) (pp.
297–302). Amar even asks readers to think of Spencer Tracy as Adam and
Katharine Hepburn as Eve from the 1949 movie Adam’s Rib (p. 297). It is
unclear why Amar uses this literary device instead of direct prose statements
and argument, nor is it apparent why he does not simply present Eve’s view
as his own. A Socratic dialogue probably meant to illuminate the “[s]ocial
meaning outside the terse text” (p. 303) cannot supply the authority for the
constitutional treatment of gender differences.
Amar’s treatment of women’s rights reveals the problem with his approach: It has no limiting principle. Amar’s unwritten Constitution grants
women and gay people the same rights as those reserved for racial minorities, but it cannot explain its principle for including some groups, but not
others, once we have discarded the original understanding. Unwritten constitutional rights may depend on the enlightened perspectives of judges or
law professors (far removed from the Constitution’s grant of political power
to “the People,” via the means of plebiscite), but if they have no common
methodology, the lines will prove unpredictable. And wherever those lines
happens to lie, Unwritten would take those fundamental decisions away
from the political process.
Take, for example, socioeconomic class. Class may be one of the more
durable traits in dictating the government’s treatment of someone. Wealth
makes available a great many other things, such as employment opportunities, material comfort, educational access, political influence, and social status. Discrimination based on wealth may have a long history in our country,
and social mobility might be low. We could say that many of the framers of
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the Constitution and of the Reconstruction Amendments—although certainly not all—wanted to open up American society to allow for greater
social mobility. The framers might even have favored a market economy that
rewarded individual talent, not inherited wealth. Broad populist movements
have periodically swept the land, sometimes pushing radical measures to
debase the currency, confiscate property, nullify debts, or redistribute income. If Unwritten finds constitutional protections for gender and sexual
orientation, Amar should find similar rights for those the government treats
differently because of their socioeconomic status.
Amar’s lack of a limiting principle comes from the very purpose of Unwritten: to leave the constitutional text behind. Text restricts the amorphous
moral imaginations of judges. Without a text, however, interpreters are loose
agents. They can still bring a set of coherent principles to the Constitution,
but they might also allow their preferences and their imaginations to run
wild. Some, such as Ronald Dworkin, will claim that the Constitution must
fit a conception of a liberal-democratic society akin to that sketched out in
John Rawls’s theory of justice.17 Some, such as Hadley Arkes or Robert
George, might inform the Constitution with natural law.18 For his part, John
Hart Ely has proposed that the Constitution be construed in a way that
reinforces democratic “values.”19 Others might want the Constitution interpreted according to their critical theories of racial or economic progress. Yet
still others might try to supplement the Constitution’s procedures for
amendments with their own procedures. Bruce Ackerman, for example, has
attempted to defend the unwritten changes to the Constitution during the
New Deal by claiming that sufficient supermajorities would have enacted
them anyway.20 All of these approaches, no matter how fanciful, share a goal
with Amar’s approach: to cure an imperfect Constitution by resorting to a
set of principles outside the document. And yet they run counter to Justice
Holmes’s sentiment that the Constitution, like its Fourteenth Amendment,
“does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics”—nor any other subterranean philosophy divorced from the Constitution’s text.21
Originalism seeks to forestall such moves beyond the Constitution.
Amar parts ways with Biography’s approach, however, because he finds
originalism’s results so unacceptable. But formal legal equality for women in
American society arrived through a combination of Supreme Court decisions, congressional statutes, and changing social norms. The question, however, is not the result itself but whether the result should have come about
through unwritten constitutional amendment or by statute. Amar must hold
great doubt that the American people would have expanded women’s rights
by statute to the same level as today. He is willing to sacrifice originalism to
17. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 363–69 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution (1990); Robert P. George, In
Defense of Natural Law (1999).
19. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
20. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 40–50 (1991).
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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get there, but his technique, if in different hands, could produce a range of
other nontextual results, such as Plessy’s separate-but-equal segregation.22
Before giving up so quickly on the constitutional text, we think it worthwhile to look more carefully at originalism and the principles behind it. The
next Part examines the recent history and contemporary practice of originalist interpretation to determine whether its outcomes are indeed so beyond
the pale. We conclude with some alternative justifications for originalism
today.
II. The Origins of Contemporary Originalism
Among the many contemporary theories of constitutional interpretation, “originalism” occupies pride of place.23 At least two conservative Supreme Court justices have proclaimed their belief in it; Justice Scalia, who
had once publicly regarded himself as “fainthearted,” has since “repudiate[d]” this characterization and now regards himself as an “honest,” if
stouthearted, originalist—the justice implied that a fainthearted originalist
cannot be an honest one.24 Other justices are at least “moderate” originalists,
in the sense that the original meaning of constitutional clauses and the intentions behind them serve as important elements of their constitutional
reasoning. And no liberal theory of constitutional interpretation has commanded the support of even the liberal bloc on the Court. The extent of
originalism’s influence was clearly seen in the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision on the Second Amendment, District of Columbia v. Heller.25 The majority opinion (by Justice Scalia) and the lead dissent (by Justice Stevens)
fought a constitutional duel on consciously originalist terms.26 Likewise, in
the 1995 Term Limits case,27 Justices Stevens and Thomas sparred over the
framers’ intentions in the Qualifications Clauses.28 In Lee v. Weisman,29 Justice Souter sought to refute, on originalist grounds, the originalist position
that then-Justice Rehnquist had staked out earlier in his dissent in Wallace v.
Jaffree.30 Even liberal justices now speak in an originalist dialect. And in the
legal academy, both liberal scholars like Amar and his colleague Professor
22. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1388.
23. Even in 1999, it could be said that originalism “is now the prevailing approach to
constitutional interpretation,” despite the powerful criticisms that had been directed against it.
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 613 (1999).
24. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 854 (1989);
Clarence Thomas, Lecture, Judging, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1996); Jennifer Senior, In
Conversation: Antonin Scalia, New York, Oct. 14, 2013, at 22, 24, available at http://nymag
.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10.
25. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
26. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–78 (Scalia, J.); id. at 636–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 782–838 (1995) (Stevens, J.); id. at
845–926 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
28. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
29. 505 U.S. 577, 609, 612–17 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
30. 472 U.S. 38, 91–98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Balkin,31 and conservative scholars like Professor McGinnis and Professor
Rappaport32 (to name but a few), are in at least a broad sense “originalists.”
How did this come about, and is originalism’s influence deserved? We start
with a thumbnail sketch of the origins of contemporary originalism.33
A. In the Beginning Was Bork (and Bickel and Wechsler)
If contemporary originalism34 can be assigned a definite starting point,
that point must be the publication of Robert Bork’s Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems.35 In that article, Bork came at the subject
of originalism from, so to speak, a sidewise direction: as its title reflects,
Bork’s paper started out with a discussion of the scholarly controversy over
the Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions that stemmed from Herbert
Wechsler’s celebrated article, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law.36 Wechsler’s article was part of a broader debate among legal scholars
over the doctrinal defensibility of the Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions. That debate had roiled the legal academy for well over a decade before
Bork entered the fray, and several of Bork’s colleagues on the Yale Law
School faculty had been actively engaged in it.37 Like some of these controversialists, Bork doubted the strength of the doctrinal underpinnings of the
desegregation decisions, and, more generally, he was troubled by what he
31. See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011).
32. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good
Constitution (2013).
33. For more extensive accounts, see, for example, Balkin, supra note 31, at 100–08;
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923,
927–40 (2009); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 599
(2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism]; Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 375 (2013) [hereinafter Whittington, Originalism: A
Critical Introduction].
34. There was, to be sure, an originalism before contemporary originalism, see Jack N.
Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 Const. Comment. 159, 171–73
(1996), although it has been argued that the resemblances between early and contemporary
originalism are superficial, see H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not an Originalist”, 7 U. St.
Thomas L.J. 259, 264–65 (2010). And “originalist constitutional interpretation as a discipline—that is, as a distinct subject with a distinct methodology—actually came into being . . .
in the late nineteenth century.” Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 907, 907 (2008).
35. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J.
1 (1971), reprinted in Robert H. Bork, A Time to Speak: Selected Writings and Arguments 186 (2008). There were, to be sure, other legal scholars whose ideas provided a foundation for early contemporary originalism. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary:
The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 283–84 (1997).
36. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1959).
37. See Alexander M. Bickel, Politics and the Warren Court (1965); Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955);
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421 (1960).
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regarded as judicial overreach. Indeed, in the same year Bork published Neutral Principles, he also published a semipopular article entitled We Suddenly
Feel that Law Is Vulnerable.38 The latter article sheds light on the origins of
originalism: it was, in part, an expression of, and a response to, anxieties
that were widely felt during the Nixon era and that had cultural and political
roots, no less than legal ones.39
Bork’s writing from the period heralded themes that would recur in his
(and others’) writings on originalism: the insistence (as against the legal
realists) that autonomous, rule-governed legal reasoning is indeed possible;
the necessity of keeping the majoritarian functions of the political branches
and the countermajoritarian functions of the judiciary firmly apart; the imperative need to distinguish legal reasoning from the exercise of power, so
that constitutional adjudication cannot be collapsed into policymaking, even
of an exceptionally high order; and the corresponding importance of judicial
restraint, in the sense of a deep reluctance on the part of judges to declare
legislative or executive action unconstitutional.40
Furthermore, in company with many other later originalists (although
signally not with Amar), Bork had little esteem for the decisions of the Warren Court. But Bork’s criticism focused on what he regarded as its deficiencies in judicial craftsmanship—the flaws in its decisions as measured by
standards of general rules, of consistency, and of intellectual rigor—rather
than on the failure of its reasoning to correspond to the original intent behind the constitutional provisions it was interpreting. Bork seemed to be
saying that the chief vice of the Warren Court was its adherence to “legal
realism”41 and that the main corrective to that vice would be more
38. Robert H. Bork, We Suddenly Feel that Law Is Vulnerable, Fortune, Dec. 1971, at
115, reprinted in A Time to Speak: Selected Writings and Arguments, supra note 35, at
585.
39. Id. at 588–89.
40. “Judicial restraint” is a term with varying meanings. In one sense, it could refer to a
reluctance to overturn preexisting constitutional case law. Bork did not argue for “restraint” in
that sense—quite the opposite, in fact. “Judicial restraint” might also refer to a judicial practice, not of deferring to the decisions of the political branches, but of declining, on various
grounds, to review them at all.
41. The core of “legal realism” as understood at the time was the doctrine that judicial
decisionmaking is not primarily a matter of applying rules. See C.J. Friedrich, Karl Llewellyn’s
Legal Realism in Retrospect, 74 Ethics 201, 205 (1964). Among more recent writers, Judge
Posner should be counted as an exponent of legal realism. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Realism
About Judges, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577 (2011). “Legal realism” had long been a powerful intellectual current at leading American law schools, such as Bork’s Yale. See Laura Kalman,
Legal Realism at Yale 1927–1960 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (1986). The “legal
process” school at Yale, led by Bork’s friend and colleague Bickel, had emerged in response to
it. For an account of the relationships among realism, process, and originalism, see
Johnathan O’Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional
History 47–66 (2005). The leading judicial exponent of the legal process viewpoint was Justice Frankfurter, see, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119–20 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
527 (1947), and Bickel was Frankfurter’s clerk, friend, and disciple, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
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committed dedication to “legal process.”42 Only in Neutral Principles did
Bork begin to distinguish his originalist critique from the types of critiques
that Wechsler (and even more, Bork’s colleague Alexander Bickel43) were apt
to make.
In the article that provided the backdrop for Bork’s first thoughts on
originalism, Wechsler had criticized the Court’s decisions because they were
often unrooted in “neutral principles.”44 By a “principled decision,” he carefully explained, he meant “one that rests on reasons with respect to all the
issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”45 Some of Wechsler’s criticisms
faulted the Court for not being “neutral”—that is, consistent— in applying
the principles that underlay its decisions.46 More important for Wechsler,
however, was the point that the Court had too often failed to articulate or
define the operative principle on which a decision rested. Thus, he complained that the Court had issued a series of per curiam decisions in the
wake of Brown v. Board of Education47 in which it had ordered the desegregation of various public facilities—transportation, parks, golf courses, bath
houses—without identifying any underlying legal principle that rendered
segregation in these varied contexts unconstitutional.48 Similarly, he argued
that the desegregation cases posed a choice between two incompatible applications of the principle of freedom of association and that the Court had
been unable to explain why one application of the principle was to be preferred over the other.49
Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 521, 527–28
(1976).
42. Indeed, in a fascinating 1968 article in Fortune, Bork repeatedly emphasized the Warren Court’s asserted failures of “craftsmanship” in criticizing its decisions. For Bork at that
time, “craftsmanship” did not include reliance on an originalist interpretative method. Rather,
he took “craftsmanship” to “mean respect for such things as logic, consistency, history, precedent, and the allowable meanings of words.” Robert H. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New
Philosophy, Fortune, Dec. 1968, at 140, 142. In this article, Bork appeared to believe that the
proper antidote to legal realism was legal process.
43. Bork’s work at this time shows the clear influence of Bickel. In a posthumous (1979)
appreciation entitled The Legacy of Alexander M. Bickel, Bork elegiacally wrote as follows:
[Bickel] counted on a judicial tradition of modesty, intellectual coherence, the morality
of process, to make judicial supremacy tolerable. These traits have often been lacking on
the Court and [Bickel] felt they may have been damaged beyond repair by the Warren
Court. We have never had a rigorous theory of judicial restraint; for a time we had a
tradition; now that is almost gone.

Robert H. Bork, The Legacy of Alexander M. Bickel, Yale L. Rep., Fall 1979, at 6, reprinted in A
Time to Speak: Selected Writings and Arguments, supra note 35, at 684, 690.
44. Wechsler, supra note 36.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 17.
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. Wechsler, supra note 36, at 22.
49. Id. at 34 (“[I]f the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces
an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant. Is this not the heart of the
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Wechsler was reasonably clear, however, that the Court’s decisions could
be both “neutral” and “principled” even if they were nonoriginalist. Thus, he
maintained that the Court had correctly interpreted the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to “imply a right to court-appointed counsel when the defendant is too poor to find such aid,” even though he believed that “when
the sixth amendment was proposed, a right to defend by counsel if you have
one [was] contrary to what was then the English law.”50
It is strange, therefore, that Bork’s defense of originalism began with a
lengthy account of the need for neutrality in the application of principles.
Only after that did he turn to considering neutrality in the definition of
principles; and only at the end did he take up the need for neutrality in the
derivation of principles.51 But originalism has little or nothing special to say
about neutrality in applying principles or even in defining them; it is primarily an answer to the question of how constitutional principles are to be
derived, that is, it is a methodology of constitutional interpretation.
When it came to that crucial question, however, Bork’s paper was disappointing. He said merely the following:
There appear to be two proper methods of deriving rights from the Constitution. The first is to take from the document rather specific values that
text or history shows the framers actually to have intended and that are
capable of being translated into principled rules. We may call these specified rights. The second method derives rights from governmental processes
established by the Constitution. These are secondary or derived individual
rights.52

Bork did not explain why judges must seek to discover the “rather specific values” that “the framers actually . . . intended.” True, if judges did that,
they would be deriving constitutional rules from “neutral” sources, in the
sense that the judges’ reasoning would not be driven by the desire to reach
the particular outcomes that they preferred but by considerations that could
lead them either way in terms of results. The constitutional materials used in
judicial decisionmaking would therefore reflect not the judges’ values but
rather (ideally) those of the framers. Nonetheless, if achieving “neutrality”
in that sense is an overriding desideratum, it is not true to say that the only
issue involved, a conflict . . . of high dimension, not unlike many others that involve the
highest freedoms . . . . Given a situation where the state must practically choose between
denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would
avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that
the claims for association should prevail?” (footnote omitted)).
50. Id. at 18. But see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Similarly, Wechsler
criticized Learned Hand’s view that courts should apply “a fixed ‘historical meaning’ of constitutional provisions.” Wechsler, supra note 36, at 16.
51. See Bork, supra note 35, at 192.
52. See id. at 201–02. To be sure, Bork did return to the explanation and defense of
originalism in later works. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political
Seduction of the Law (1990); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 San Diego L. Rev. 823 (1986); Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. Tex. L.J. 383, 394 (1985).
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way to achieve it is through identifying the framers’ intentions and giving
them controlling weight. Judges could derive specific rules for constitutional
decisions from, say, the natural law, rather than from the framers’ values, in
an equally “neutral” fashion. Or judges could base their decisions on the
consistent application of constitutional precedent. A judge governed by natural law or case law could derive specific rules of decision from “neutral”
constitutional materials that would be just as robust as the principles employed by a judge bound solely by the framers’ original intentions. Originalism as the exclusive or primary method of deriving constitutional rules of
decision has to be defended on grounds other than the claim that it alone
ensures that the derivation of constitutional rules will be “neutral.”
B. Originalism and “Judicial Restraint”
At this point in the development of his ideas, Bork was not primarily
occupied with the question of constitutional interpretation but rather with
the question of judicial restraint. It might seem to some that he invented
“originalism” and then conscripted it to serve the ends of judicial restraint.53
But originalism is neither the only nor even the most effective means of
ensuring such restraint. True, originalism commended itself to Bork (and
many later writers) because it was thought of as a bridle on judges, restraining their forays into policymaking and reserving more scope and flexibility for the political branches.54 But originalism is a theory of
constitutional interpretation, not of judicial restraint.55 In application,
originalism could in principle lead to overturning majoritarian decisions as
often as it leads to sustaining them: Heller might arguably stand as an example of originalist “activism.” (Indeed, some liberal scholars and a law-andeconomics judge have argued that originalism is essentially conservative political activism in jurisprudential garb.56) Simply denying the possibility of
53. See Johnathan O’Neill, Shaping Modern Constitutional Theory: Bickel and Bork Confront the Warren Court, 65 Rev. Pol. 325, 337–38, 341–42 (2003).
54. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and
the Law 42 (1997) (“As things now stand, the state and federal governments may either apply
capital punishment or abolish it, permit suicide or forbid it—all as the changing times and the
changing sentiments of society may demand. But when capital punishment is held to violate
the Eighth Amendment, and suicide is held to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, all
flexibility with regard to those matters will be gone.”).
55. At this early point in the development of originalism, judicial restraint seems to have
been more important for conservative critics of the Warren Court than methods of constitutional interpretation. Later originalists have tended to place less emphasis on the need for such
restraint. See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 33, at 602, 608.
56. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 569 (2006) (“[F]or the past quarter century
originalism has been animated less by its jurisprudence than by its political practice, which is
deeply inconsistent with that jurisprudence. As a political practice, originalism does not preserve a fixed and unchanging Constitution; it does not transparently reproduce the democratic
consent of the Constitution’s ratifiers; it does not focus on process rather than outcomes. As a
political practice, originalism seeks instead to forge a vibrant connection between the Constitution and contemporary conservative values.”); Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin
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judicial review altogether would be a far more effective means of curbing
judicial “activism” than originalism could ever be. James Bradley Thayer’s
idea of judicial “deference”—that judges should invalidate statutes only
when their unconstitutionality is so clear that it is not open to rational question—would also be far more protective of majoritarianism than originalism
is.57
Likewise, a judicial practice of declaring much of the Constitution nonjusticiable would also restrain judicial interference with the political process.
Thus, after Luther v. Borden,58 there was for decades virtually no significant
litigation under the Republican Guarantee Clause,59 although there otherwise might well have been. Similarly, the frequent judicial determination
that disputes over the Constitution’s allocation of war powers are not justiciable (or that plaintiffs lack standing to bring such claims) has cleared much
of that important area from litigation, at least until recently. And perhaps
the current Court, after several decades of inconclusive and erratic constitutional litigation, has all but decided to remit the question of affirmative action (at least in higher education) to the political arena.60
In any case, originalism has clearly parted company with belief in judicial restraint. Although they were closely intertwined in Bork’s writings,
there was never a robust conceptual relationship between them.61 And both
in judicial practice and legal scholarship, they have grown far apart. There
can be (and are) both liberal and conservative exponents of judicial activism
Scalia, New Republic, Sept. 13, 2012, at 18, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (“[T]ext
as such may be politically neutral, but textualism is conservative.”).
57. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 142 (1893). Although Thayer’s influence has receded, some legal
scholars espouse a doctrine similar to his. See Jeffrey Rosen, Originalism and Pragmatism: False
Friends, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 937 (2008). For an account of Thayer’s “deference,” his
followers, his later influence, and a critique of his views, see Richard A. Posner, The Rise and
Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 519 (2012) (arguing that the rise of theories of
constitutional interpretation—such as originalism—has undercut Thayer’s case for judicial
restraint).
58. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
59. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. On the Republican Guarantee Clause, see Charles O. Lerche,
Jr., The Guarantee Clause in Constitutional Law, 2 W. Pol. Q. 358 (1949).
60. Compare Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (no equal
protection violation in state rollback of affirmative action program), with Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (declaring strict scrutiny to be the applicable standard of
review for affirmative action program in state higher education but remanding the case rather
than applying the standard). Combining Schuette with the apparently relaxed “strict scrutiny”
standard adopted in Fisher, one might reasonably conclude that the Court will uphold state
affirmative action programs except in outlier or extreme cases but will also permit the political
process to undo such programs. Given the highly abstract and indeterminate text of the Equal
Protection Clause and the paucity of materials relevant to discerning what the original intent
of the framers and ratifiers of that clause might have been with regard to affirmative action, an
originalist might well approve of the Court’s current stance (if we have described it correctly).
61. See Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, supra note 33, at 392–94.
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who also fly the standard of originalism; there can be (and are) advocates of
judicial restraint who are nonoriginalists.62
C. Originalism After Bork: Criticisms and Corrections
Bork’s 1971 article was the catalyst for extensive scholarly and political
commentary—much of it critical, but also much sympathetic—in the years
that followed.63 Several overlapping but distinguishable lines of criticism developed during the more than forty years following the article’s publication.
First, critics noted the extreme difficulty, or even in some cases the impossibility, of ascertaining what the original intent of the framers was. It was
argued that evidence of their intentions can be fragmentary, incomplete,
contradictory, or nonexistent. (Astonishingly, Bork himself had raised precisely these difficulties three years before writing Neutral Principles.64) Especially when constitutional rules must be fashioned to address situations that
the framers could not have imagined, their “intentions” were likely to be
highly indeterminate65: one is engaging in counterfactual guesswork.66 Moreover, specialized historical knowledge would be needed in order to appreciate the evidence in its context before reliable inferences concerning intent
could be made. And not only was such specialized scholarship needed but a
“historicist” appreciation of the distinct otherness of the past would be required before it could be brought to bear on contemporary controversies.67
Furthermore, the critics noted that the framers who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 were a corporate body, consisting of men with strongly held
but sharply different views. Recovering the “intent” of a large, diversified
corporate body can have special difficulties of its own.68 Even the most
62. Compare, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (rev. ed. 2014) (the former), with Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist
and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 Mich. L.
Rev. 1081 (2005) (the latter).
63. A Google search reveals nearly 3,000 citations to it. See Google Scholar, http://
scholar.google.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2015) (search “Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems”).
64. “History can be of considerable help, but it tells us much too little about the specific
intentions of the men who framed, adopted, and ratified the great clauses. The record is incomplete, the men involved often had vague or even conflicting intentions, and no one foresaw, or could have foreseen, the disputes that changing social conditions and outlooks would
bring before the Court.” Bork, supra note 42, at 143.
65. See Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 437 (1996).
66. See Bork, supra note 35, at 199 (discussing Brown and stating that “[t]he Court cannot conceivably know how these long dead [framers and ratifiers of the Equal Protection
Clause] would have resolved these issues had they considered, debated and voted on each of
them. Perhaps it was precisely because they could not resolve them that they took refuge in the
majestic and ambiguous formula: the equal protection of the laws”).
67. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1185, 1205–09.
68. For a celebrated analysis of several of these problems, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 212–15 (1980). Professor
Brest is credited with coining the term “originalism.”
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prominent speakers may not reflect the consensus of opinion within the
body at large. Language may be drafted with deliberate vagueness or ambiguity as a compromise measure, submerging intractable differences and deferring further controversy in order to secure an agreed-upon text. Secret
bargains may be struck that result in clauses whose true purposes do not
appear on the public record. And so on.69
Second, the framers were not the only, or even the most important,
makers of the original Constitution: the state ratifying conventions were the
primary or sole constitutional creators. The intentions of the framers, insofar
as they might differ from those of the ratifiers, should therefore count for
little or nothing, except insofar as the ratifiers were aware of the framers’
intentions and made them their own.70 The framers can be compared to the
drafters of a legal instrument, such as a will or a contract; the ratifiers, to the
principals (testators or contracting parties) whose purposes the drafters seek
to serve. If intentions are to be consulted at all, they must, then, be the
intentions of the ratifiers. This type of objection could be interwoven with
the first: the ratifying conventions were themselves separate corporate bodies
meeting in the different states, which compounds the difficulty of ascertaining the putatively original, but corporate, intent.71
Originalists generally responded to these criticisms by shifting their
grounds from original intent to original (public) meaning.72 But although
“public meaning” originalism appeared to correct some of the defects of
“original intent” originalism, it was open to the objection that, even in the
1790s, there was great controversy about the public meaning of important
constitutional terms and clauses.73 (Consider, for instance, the debate in
69. It is arguable, however, that the originalists of the 1970s and 1980s were not centrally
concerned with the framers’ subjective intentions and that the criticisms focused on that issue
were therefore at least somewhat off target. See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 33,
at 603.
70. See Charles A. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History 157–58
(1969); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Comment. 77, 84–85 (1988).
71. See Kramer, supra note 34, at 910.
72. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, supra note 33, at 378–82; Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 33, at 610; see also Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black
Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 751, 758–59 (1987). There are competing
narratives—and evaluations—of the shift from original intent to original public meaning. For
a favorable account of the shift, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1136–48 (2003). For a
more critical view arguing the case on behalf of intentionalist originalism, see Richard S. Kay,
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 703,
705–09 (2009).
73. See Kramer, supra note 34, at 911. It is not as though early originalists were altogether unaware of this fact, although their attempts to address it may have been weak. Even in
the 1980s, Edwin Meese, President Reagan’s attorney general, spoke on the issue, arguing as
follows:
Where there is a demonstrable consensus among the Framers and ratifiers as to a principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it should be followed. Where there is ambiguity
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1791 in President Washington’s first cabinet between Secretary of State Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton over the meaning of “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause.74) And the original public
meaning of other crucial constitutional terms (for example, the term “person” in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment or “commerce” in Article I,
Section 875) may be the subject of current controversy.76
D. Original Meaning and Original Expected Applications
Furthermore, even when the original public meaning of a clause was at
first and still is now agreed upon, the applications of that clause might be
uncertain, especially (but not only) when the original meaning is highly abstract and indeterminate. For example, the public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause seems tolerably obvious (the bare language seems to mean
now what it meant at the time of its ratification), but how is the clause to be
applied? Many scholarly originalists have argued that the application of such
language should ordinarily be controlled by reference to the consequences or
applications of it that the ratifying generation would have held.77 Not only
does that move take the interpreter well beyond the text but it also calls for
constitutional construction.78 And not only is “construction” distinct from
“interpretation” but the argument for basing constructions only on ratification-era expectations would itself have to be made.79 For instance, in a presidential impeachment trial, should the House and Senate be guided by the
framing era’s likely expectations (assuming they were discoverable) of what
as to the precise meaning or reach of a constitutional provision, it should be interpreted
and applied in a manner so as to at least not contradict the text of the Constitution itself.

Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 875, 883 (2008) (quoting Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the D.C.
Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 71, 76 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007)).
74. Compare Thomas Jefferson, Sec’y of State, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the
Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in Michael Stokes Paulsen et al., The Constitution of
the United States 60–62 (2d ed. 2013), with Alexander Hamilton, Sec’y of the Treasury,
Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in The Constitution
of the United States, supra, at 62–66.
75. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 149–59.
76. E.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 13
(2013).
77. See Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, supra note 33, at 382–86 (discussing reliance on original expected applications); id. at 386–87 (discussing the question of to
what extent the Constitution delegates substantial discretion to the judiciary to fashion practical rules of implementation).
78. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L.
Rev. 453, 457 (2013) (“[C]onstitutional construction is ubiquitous in constitutional practice.
The central warrant for this claim is conceptual: because construction is the determination of
legal effect, construction always occurs when the constitutional text is applied to a particular
legal case or official decision.”).
79. Balkin has pressed these points as follows:
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would count as a “high Crime[ ]” or “Misdemeanour[ ],”80 or might they
fashion a different standard?
Originalists have sometimes failed to recognize the necessity and importance of constitutional construction. Yet construction plays a crucial role—
perhaps even the leading role—in constitutional adjudication. Courts may
derive and enforce rules that could not be inferred from the original public
meaning alone but that are intended, for example, to preserve or promote
the values that the constitutional text is understood to serve. The Warren
Court fashioned and applied the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio,81 not
under the compulsion of the original meaning or intent of the Fourth
Amendment, but with the aim of protecting the value of privacy that it saw
at the amendment’s core.82 Miranda warnings were a similar constitutional
If original meaning is original semantic meaning—the concepts that the framers employed in the words they chose—then fidelity to original meaning does not require following what the framing generation thought the consequences of adopting the words
would be. That is especially so when the text employs abstract principles or vague standards. The logical consequence of moving from original intention . . . to original meaning is that original meaning originalism . . . becomes a form of living constitutionalism.
Needless to say, this is not what most conservative originalists were looking for. . . .
. . . [C]ontemporaneous constructions may be quite important and persuasive authority, and especially powerful in the first decades after adoption. But we should not
confuse these constructions with original meaning . . . .

Balkin, supra note 31, at 104.
While this is not the place to respond fully to Balkin’s challenge, we would make three
points. First, Balkin conceptualizes the Equal Protection Clause as a delegation of power from
the Reconstruction-era generation to later generations: the very indeterminacy of the clause’s
language is supposed to “delegate the articulation and implementation of important constitutional principles to the future.” Id. at 107. But on that understanding, constitutional law becomes subject to incessant changes that would destabilize entrenched expectations and subvert
respect for the law. (Bork made essentially that criticism of the Warren Court.) See McGinnis
& Rappaport, supra note 32, at 204 (stating that “living constitutionalism undermines the
objectivity of law”). Moreover, we would expect such constitutional innovations to be ever
more sweeping and radical as the distance between the Reconstruction era and later generations widens.
Second, to whom is the purported delegation made? To the judiciary alone? Or to “the
People” of the future, as organized into a political community under the Constitution? If to
the latter, it would seem that the Court could not claim to be the only, or the supreme,
interpreter of the Equal Protection Clause. The national legislature would have a much better
claim to the leading role, and a “judicial supremacy” case such as City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997), would have been wrongly decided. Perhaps the Court might legitimately
occupy a secondary role as the interpreter of the Equal Protection Clause in default of congressional action; but if Congress spoke to the meaning and application of the clause, the Court
should defer to it.
Third, is the purported “delegation” accompanied by an “intelligible standard” to control
the interpretations that future generations would wish to place on the clause? If not, then in
what way did the Reconstruction-era generation hope to affect the future? Simply bequeathing
the bare language of “equal protection” would have been no constraint at all. If, by contrast,
there was an intelligible standard to guide future interpreters, what could it have been other
than the original expected applications?
80. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
81. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
82. Wrongly, according to Amar. See pp. 172–74.
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construct, designed as a prophylaxis against Fifth Amendment violations by
the police.83 Roe v. Wade’s84 trimester system and Casey’s85 emphasis on fetal
viability were both judge-made constructs that attempted to find a workable
“balance” between (what the Court took to be) a pregnant woman’s constitutionally protected interests in liberty or privacy and the state’s legitimate
interests in protecting unborn human life. Construction is also needed to fill
in gaps in the constitutional text. For example, the Suspension Clause permits the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in cases of “Rebellion or
Invasion” but does not specify who has the power to suspend it.86 Using
constructivist logic, Chief Justice Taney argued in Ex parte Merryman87 that
the power was solely congressional; President Lincoln countered the Chief
Justice’s reasoning with a constructivist argument of his own.88
Whatever one thinks about these particular controversies, construction
seems to be unavoidable even after the interpretative questions posed by a
constitutional text have been fully answered. This seems most especially true
of open-textured constitutional clauses like the Equal Protection Clause or
the Due Process Clauses. Originalism therefore needs a theory that would
distinguish between valid and invalid constructions.89 Interestingly, in Neutral Principles, Bork seems to have recognized the need for construction, as
distinct from interpretation. There, he distinguished between constitutionally “specified rights” and “[s]econdary or derivative rights.”90 The latter are
“extraordinarily important” but not immediately derivable from “text or
history.”91 They do not exist “because the Constitution has made a value
choice about individuals,” but rather they are “located in the individual for
the sake of a governmental process that the Constitution outlines and the
Court should preserve.”92 For instance, Bork argued that claims to the right
to an equal vote in the legislative reapportionment cases should not have
been decided by reference to the Equal Protection Clause; it would have been
far better to derive the relevant rights from the Republican Guarantee Clause
83. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000) (holding Miranda to have stated a constitutional rule).
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
86. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
87. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
88. Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 7 A Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, at 3221, 3227–29, 3231–32
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
89. For an outline of one such theory, see Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1431–41. Although
based on constitutional text and structure, Paulsen’s originalist theory of construction is itself
(inevitably, it seems) a construction.
90. Bork, supra note 35, at 202.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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or on the basis of “constitutional structure and political practice.”93 Regardless, in either case, the “derivation” required construction, not merely
interpretation.
Another line of criticism found that originalism, consistently applied,
pointed beyond itself: it was, at the worst, self-refuting. The argument was
that if constitutional decisionmakers were supposed to follow the framers’
intentions, then they would also be bound to follow the framers’ intentions
with regard to rules of interpretation. But this, it was argued, would require
the decisionmakers to consult, and be guided by, authorities other than the
framers’ intentions, notably constitutional structure.94 Furthermore, although this criticism was directed at “original intent” originalism, it could
be (and has been) recycled as an objection to “original public meaning”
originalism, in the form of the argument that recourse to original public
meaning was “at odds with the dominant modes of constitutional interpretation in place at the time the Constitution was debated and ratified.”95
Closely allied to this line of criticism is the objection that the actual
interpretative practice of constitutional adjudication in the early republic
(and after) was not originalist. Rather, it drew eclectically on source materials that included evidence of original meaning and intent but were not limited to them. As Professor Kramer put it, “Everyone essentially believed that
the Constitution could and should be interpreted using the same, open-ended process of forensic argument that was employed across legal domains—
marshalling (as applicable, and in a relatively unstructured manner) arguments from text, structure, history, precedent, and consequences to reach
the most persuasive overall conclusion.”96 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in

93. Id. at 203. Amar works out Bork’s suggestion in detail, arguing for the Republican
Guarantee Clause as a sounder basis for the reapportionment decisions. See pp. 190–92.
94. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 885, 885 (1985) (arguing that the “modern resort to the ‘intent of the framers’ can gain
no support from the assertion that such was the framers’ expectation, for the framers themselves did not believe such an interpretive strategy to be appropriate”). For critical responses,
see Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This
Constitution”, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1177, 1186–1220 (1987), and Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 226, 273–81 (1988). More recently, Robert Natelson has argued that statutory interpretation in the founding era assigned a controlling role to the lawmakers’ intentions. See Robert
G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent,
68 Ohio St. L.J. 1239 (2007). We would also note that, although James Madison expressed
different views at different times, he did say late in life that the “key to the sense of the
Constitution” was to be found “in the proceedings of the Convention, the contemporary expositions, and above all in the ratifying Conventions of the States.” Letter from James Madison to
Andrew Stevenson (Mar. 25, 1826), reprinted in 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 473–74 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
95. Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian
Critique, 67 Md. L. Rev. 150, 150 (2007).
96. Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 Calif. L.
Rev. 621, 624 (2012).
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McCulloch v. Maryland,97 much admired and imitated by Amar,98 could be
seen as representative of an open-ended interpretative approach. So (to cite a
later example) is Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Nixon v. United
States.99
E. Originalism Versus Pluralism
Originalism has been understood as the belief that “only certain sorts of
historical evidence, such as the understandings of constitutional meaning of
the Philadelphia framers or ratifiers of the Constitution, are legitimate in
constitutional interpretation.”100 So understood, it lays claim to exclusivity in
constitutional interpretation. “Exclusive originalism . . . has real bite as a
constitutional theory. It asserts that other methods of interpretation are
wrong or illegitimate . . . .”101 Opposed to originalism (so understood) is not
nonoriginalism but pluralism: the claim that the Constitution should be expounded by a variety of interpretive methods or modalities.
One early critic of originalism who pursued this line of attack was
Thomas Grey. Grey assailed what he called “the pure interpretive model,”
which he associated with Justice Black, Bork, and others.102 Grey argued for
a “broader view of judicial review” that would accept “the courts’ additional
role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair
treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter
of positive law in the written Constitution.”103 In support of his view that
the Constitution incorporated unwritten rights and powers, Grey was even
able to play a textual card, the Ninth Amendment.104 But beyond that, he
noted that Supreme Court opinions from the founding era had expressed
such assumptions.105 For example, in Fletcher v. Peck,106 Chief Justice Marshall had held a Georgia statute invalid because it violated “general principles which are common to our free institutions,”107 such as the protection of
97. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
98. Amar writes as follows: “To read McCulloch is to behold the art of constitutional
interpretation at its acme.” P. 22. For a critique of his reading, see Strauss, supra note 5, at
1535–40.
99. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
100. Griffin, supra note 67, at 1187.
101. Id.
102. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 706
(1975) [hereinafter Grey, Unwritten Constitution?]; see also Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 Stan. L.
Rev. 843, 844–50 (1978).
103. Grey, Unwritten Constitution?, supra note 102, at 706.
104. Id. at 716.
105. Id. at 708.
106. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
107. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139.
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vested rights. Likewise, in Calder v. Bull,108 Justice Chase had stoutly defended judicial review based on the principles of natural law, not (simply)
on the text, history, and interrelationship of constitutional provisions:
There are acts which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do, without
exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent
and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by
positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private
property, for the protection whereof of the government was established.109

Grey’s study of the sources led him to conclude as follows:
For the generation that framed the Constitution, the concept of a “higher
law,” protecting “natural rights,” and taking precedence over ordinary positive law as a matter of political obligation, was widely shared and deeply
felt. . . . [I]t was generally recognized that written constitutions could not
completely codify the higher law. Thus in the framing of the original
American constitutions it was widely accepted that there remained unwritten but still binding principles of higher law.110

From such a perspective, Bork’s “originalism” reflected not so much a desire
to be faithful to the intentions of the framing generation but rather a modernist, post-Erie111 repudiation of any form of naturalism in favor of a
Holmesian legal positivism.
Furthermore, Grey argued that the systemic application of originalist
methods to existing Supreme Court case law would uproot many precedents
that had long been considered both settled and fundamental.112 And if
originalism holds itself out as the exclusive method of constitutional interpretation, it must obviously face a problem in explaining (or explaining
away) constitutional precedent. What interpretive force can precedent have,
except as an indication of what earlier justices, after considering the Constitution’s text and intent, had concluded it meant? And what if it were apparent that their conclusions were mistaken? Some originalists have decided to
reject (with varying degrees of nuance) the legitimacy of judicial reliance on
constitutional case law; others have sought to find a place for (some) precedents within an originalist framework.113
Finally, later critics of originalism’s claim to exclusivity argued that
originalism simply fails to capture the “pluralistic” character of American
108. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
109. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.
110. Grey, Unwritten Constitution?, supra note 102, at 715–16. The jurisprudence of the
antebellum period and the Reconstruction era was also attached to “natural rights” doctrine.
See id. at 716.
111. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
112. Grey, Unwritten Constitution?, supra note 102, at 710–14.
113. For a survey of originalist positions and an attempt to find a role for precedent, see
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 32, at 175–96.
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constitutional adjudication—a character with deep roots in our constitutional tradition and abundantly evident in the present.114 On one widely
influential account of constitutional interpretation and argument, recourse
to original text, meaning, or intent hardly exhausts the major “modalities”
commonly employed by courts and practitioners; such modalities also include structure, precedent or doctrine, history, prudence, and ethics.115 Are
these other modalities all to be abandoned—and if originalists think so, how
is that to be accomplished in practice? It may prove possible for originalism
to accommodate other methods or forms of constitutional interpretation,
but originalists should not “sidestep the main force of this distinctive
critique.”116
F. Originalism and Legitimation
Originalism in any form seems to depend on the core claims that original public meaning (or intent) was not only fixed at the time of textual
adoption and is still recoverable but also that, once recovered, original
meaning or intent has a normatively privileged place in constitutional adjudication.117 Accordingly, scholars have distinguished between a fixation thesis,
which goes to the original linguistic meaning of constitutional texts, and a
normative contribution thesis, which states that “the linguistic meaning of
the Constitution constrains the content of constitutional doctrine.”118 To
present the matter in an oversimplified manner, we might know the exact
original public meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. We might also
know what Madison, Hamilton, and the other framers and ratifiers intended
in adopting it. Even then, we simply might not care. Something more than
mere knowledge of a constitutional text’s meaning and intent is necessary to
vivify the text, in the sense of causing the constitutional decisionmakers to
regard it as binding and constraining them. What is the “legitimating source”
of the Constitution, if read in an originalist manner? The obvious and correct answer lies, of course, in the doctrine of popular sovereignty: “We the
People” express our sovereign will in the Constitution, and its binding force

114. It may be useful to distinguish “pluralism” as a view about the multiplicity of the
sources legitimately available to constitutional adjudicators (Grey’s main concern) from “pluralism” as a view about the variety of methods that may legitimately be used in such adjudication (the focus of later criticism).
115. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 23–24
(1982).
116. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, supra note 33, at 388.
117. See Powell, supra note 34, at 266 (“The argument over originalism is a debate over a
question of law.”).
118. Solum, supra note 33, at 954; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1275, 1317–18 (2006); Whittington,
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, supra note 33, at 378.
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derives from that will.119 But that answer plainly does not decide the question of whether originalism is the true method of determining “the People’s”
sovereign will.
Two distinct types of answers to the legitimation question seem to appear in current originalism. One type is internal or backward looking: it defends the normativity of originalism by reference to the circumstances of the
founding and ratification of the Constitution (and its several amendments).
The other type is external or forward looking: it argues that an originalist
interpretation of the Constitution produces better consequences if applied
consistently than any other method of constitutional interpretation (and in
particular, better consequences than those that would follow from recurring
judicial departures from the originalist method).
Professor Kay has ably made the first, internal type of normative argument. He argues that the founders and ratifiers possess a unique authority as
lawgivers and that the later constitutional decisionmaking derives whatever
authority it has because of their authority:
The normative force of any legal rule is, first and foremost, the consequence of regard for the lawmaker. No one is obligated to follow a rule
arising from the accidental arrangement of words . . . . Numerous colonies
of the United Kingdom entered independence under “off the rack” constitutions drafted by the departing imperial power. Over time, and apart from
the substantive quality of these constitutions, more and more such countries found it essential to replace them with indigenous instruments. No
constitution—no posited norm of any kind—can succeed if it is not regarded as the authentic command of a legitimate lawmaker.120

To say that a constitution will not be an effective governing text unless the
lawgiver is regarded as an authoritative source is, of course, not to say that
the original framers and ratifiers continue to enjoy such regard. But Kay
maintains that they do:
Certainly the population today might have serious doubts about the ratifying conventions’ right to speak for “the people” in light of the restricted
franchise of the time and doubts, perhaps, about the adequacy of indirect
democracy for questions of this magnitude. Nonetheless, it seems undeniable that contemporary attachment to the Constitution derives, in substantial part, from respect for acts of constitution-making that were
undertaken by the actual people who wrote and ratified it and a conviction
that those acts were exercises of the ultimate constituent authority of “the
people.”121

The second, external or consequentialist defense of an originalist Constitution’s normative character is exemplified in an argument of great depth
and subtlety by McGinnis and Rappaport.122 Like Kay, they agree that the
119.
120.
121.
122.

Kay, supra note 72, at 716.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 717.
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 32.
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Constitution, similar to other legal texts, derives its binding force from the
circumstances of its enactment. For them, however, the critical circumstance
is that the Constitution and its amendments were enacted through
supermajoritarian voting procedures. They argue that supermajoritarian
procedures tend to produce rules that generate, on the whole, more beneficial consequences than rules that are adopted through majoritarian (or
other) procedures. Supermajoritarian procedures filter out unwise or improvident decisions, yield outcomes that enjoy widespread and durable support, and help secure predictability and stability in the law when
entrenched.123 But the benefits of such rules will continue to flow only for as
long as they are interpreted and enforced in the sense in which the original
enactors understood them. Should they be interpreted and applied in a significantly different sense, the benefits will dry up; the rules that come to
replace them will have all the characteristic weaknesses of rules enacted
through merely majoritarian (or weaker) procedures. To be sure, some constitutional rules were distinctly unwise (such as the Prohibition-era Eighteenth Amendment), despite carrying supermajority sanction; but when their
imprudence begins to show, a superseding amendment can repeal them (in
that case, the Twenty-First Amendment, ratified only fourteen years later).
Both of these contrasting originalist approaches have attractive features.
Among other things, Kay’s analysis draws strength from the reverence that
the American public continues to feel for such figures as Washington,
Madison, and Hamilton. We suspect that rather few ordinary Americans
would feel that their local governments were bound to follow a Supreme
Court ruling on, say, the public display of the Ten Commandments, if they
thought that the mandate was ultimately based on the authority of Justice
Breyer rather than on that of Madison. McGinnis and Rappaport’s analysis
has the singular virtue of wedding an originalist approach to the Constitution’s text with a pragmatic, consequence-based argument for perseverance
in applying the original meaning.
III. Originalism Without Romance
Modern lawyers, judges, and scholars might not find a backward-looking justification for originalism compelling. Historic attachment to American history and the nation’s founders does not sound in contemporary
theories of democratic legitimacy, unless we were to assume that the American people today, if a plebiscite were to occur, would vote to continue living
under the framers’ choices. McGinnis and Rappaport’s approach might persuade those in American public law moving in an instrumental direction.
We remain unsure, however, whether originalism must walk hand in hand
with supermajority rules and even whether supermajority rules themselves
will always prove more efficient. While there are nations that have suffered
from a fragile majoritarian democracy, such as Weimar Germany, there are
also nations that have no supermajority rules, such as Great Britain, Canada,
123. Id. at 33–61.
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and other common law nations, all of which have enjoyed political stability
similar to our own.124 Indeed, supermajoritarianism derived its very utility
as compensation for the New World’s rejection of the “balanced government” created by the “separate social elements” of monarchy, aristocracy,
and the people.125 And there are nations, such as Iraq, where supermajority
rules can produce a deadlock that paralyzes the government during times of
crisis.126
In this Part, we suggest another reason to remain loyal to originalism,
despite Amar’s implicit view that it fails to yield desirable social norms. Our
argument relies on neither romanticism about American history nor instrumental attachment to supermajority rules. Instead, we borrow from bargaining theory to explain why interpreters today may rely on originalism.
Constitutions can serve as power-sharing agreements that allow different
groups to live together under one roof. Divisions can run along several different fault lines, such as geography, economic system, religion, or ethnicity.
The framers had to reach compromises between several competing groups,
such as North and South, free and slave states, large and small states, creditors and debtors, and commercial and agricultural economies. These groups
cemented their deals at the constitutional level. The framers bridged the divide that threatened the very future of the nation—the divide between large
states and small states—by creating a Congress with a House elected by the
population and a Senate representing the states. They solved another crisis
by allowing state law to decide on slavery but giving Congress the authority
to regulate the territories and to end the slave trade by 1808.
124. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America 176–77 (2014); Josep M. Colomer, Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice 43 (2001); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703, 722 (2002).
125. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at
603–04 (1969) (articulating that republican America had affirmatively departed from “various
parts of the government of [British and other Old World] social constituents,” like monarchy
and aristocracy); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 124, at 723 (stating that simple majorities
“needed to be constrained in order to avoid destructive political passions and encroachment
upon minority interests”); John O. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1751, 1777–78 (1994) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993))
(explaining, in broad brush strokes, the classlessness of American political institutions as opposed to British ones).
126. See generally Charles Ferguson, No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos
410–11 (2008) (discussing supermajority rule–induced deadlock that caused, in substantial
part, Iraqi governmental paralysis); David Ghanim, Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy
13–14 (2011) (same); The Oxford Handbook of Political Science 176 (Robert E. Goodin
ed., 2009) (discussing how supermajority rules can induce instances of “legislative paralysis
and interinstitutional conflict”); Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil 15,
17 (2001) (explaining that “supermajority requirements,” which might be “common for constitutional amendments,” nonetheless diminish the likelihood of the passage of “significant
legislation” in Latin America generally and in Brazil particularly); John Yoo, Fixing Failed
States, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 95, 144–49 (2011) (discussing the use of a constitution to commit
ethnic and religious factions to sharing power).
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Obstacles will challenge the ability of groups to agree on the compromises necessary to bring a nation together. For simplicity, assume that
just two groups, the North and the South, must agree to produce a unified
nation. They could both choose to go it alone, which might have drawbacks
and could even lead to war. Or they could reach an agreement that would
benefit each group. Rational groups should conclude such an agreement
when the gains from cooperation outweigh the benefits of separation or
conflict. Situations involving the possibility of armed conflict should produce high incentives to settle disputes peacefully because nations will want
to avoid the deadweight losses that result from going to war.127 States can
divide a resource, redraw a border, or end a struggle—all strategies that give
each side some benefit and may help avert the costs of independence or
conflict. States will generally divide the benefits of unification based on the
ratio of their expected gains had they chosen to contest rather than cooperate. This calculation will depend on their political and military strength and
their probability of prevailing in any dispute.
This approach follows the law-and-economics analysis of litigation in
which parties acting rationally and with full information should always prefer settlement to going to court, which consumes time and money without
any return.128 Similarly, states that have full information about each other
should prefer an agreement that increases the welfare of both parties over
going their separate ways. And yet groups encounter significant obstacles
that do not afflict domestic contracts in the same way. At home, parties can
rely on a legal system, backed up by courts and police, to enforce a settlement. Parties will face difficulties in reaching an agreement due to asymmetric information about the range of the settlement and about the financial
resources available for litigation. But once the parties reach a settlement,
high uncertainty will not attend the enforcement of the terms.
This is not the case with a constitution (or treaties, from which this
discussion is drawn). Leading scholars of international relations begin with
the fundamental observation that the international system is anarchic.129 The
world does not enjoy a unified government that has a monopoly on violence
and can maintain law and order. While the United Nations formally serves
as something of a world government by treaty, it has no military forces
under its direct command, it relies on the member states to provide financial
resources, and it cannot regulate private individuals directly.
127. E.g., James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 Int’l Org. 379, 380–81
(1995); Robert Powell, The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information,
98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 231, 231 (2004); Robert Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, 60 Int’l
Org. 169, 179 (2006) [hereinafter Powell, Commitment Problem].
128. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Literature 1067 (1989); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. Legal Stud. 435 (1994).
129. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace 4–16 (Kenneth W. Thompson & W. David Clinton eds., 7th ed. 2006); Kenneth N.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics 102–28 (1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The False
Promise of International Institutions, Int’l Security, Winter 1994/95, at 5, 10.
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Anarchy does not necessarily produce a philosopher’s state of nature,
with a war of all against all. Problems extending beyond a state’s borders will
yield opportunities for cooperation.130 Even in the area of security, nations
form defensive alliances that pool their resources to deter potential aggressors. Other opportunities, such as free trade, the environment, and coordination of transportation and communication, provide benefits to states if
they can cooperate. There can be little doubt about the mutual gains for
states that commit to reciprocal actions, such as lowering trade barriers to
take advantage of the law of comparative advantage. The Constitution, for
example, effectively empowered the United States to create the world’s largest free-trade area.
Anarchy, however, impedes the ability of states to enforce those agreements, despite their obvious benefits to all parties. Without international
courts or police with effective authority to force compliance, parties can
renege on an agreement—here, a constitution—without consequence other
than retaliation from the other states. This produces a classic prisoner’s dilemma: two suspects could receive lower sentences if they could only cooperate on their stories, but they cannot do so because of a lack of trust.
Similarly, states might not enter into agreements because they do not trust
their partners to live up to their promises. This problem will be particularly
acute where one party must take a first step that bears high costs before the
other party must act. For example, a state that has strong offensive military
capabilities but weak defensive systems may be reluctant to hand over territory to a national government—thereby losing its tactical advantages—without a firm guarantee that the other states will withdraw too. Without
institutional mechanisms for enforcement, the state that moves second will
have an opportunity to exploit the vulnerabilities of the state that disarmed
first. There is no guarantee that the second state will refrain from taking
advantage.
We can illustrate this problem by referring to the literature on international bargaining. As Thomas Schelling argued, “conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations.”131 Nations will seek to acquire territory,
population, goods, or resources. They will strive to stop harms, such as pollution, drugs, terrorism, disease, or excessive migration. Nations may come
into conflict when these goals meet the agenda of other nations. One nation
may want to add territory and population held by another, or may seek to
stop pollution emitted by another nation’s factories. A crisis will arise when
the two sides cannot reach an agreement that peacefully divides the benefits
at stake.
Professors Fearon and Powell have taken Schelling’s insight and constructed a sophisticated model of the choice between war and peace. Under

130. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy (1984).
131. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 5 (1960) (emphasis omitted).
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their approach, rational nations with perfect information should favor a settlement over conflict in order to resolve a dispute.132 Reaching an agreement
enables states to avoid the deadweight loss of war.133 Of course, a nation
could choose to gamble by going to war in the hopes of capturing all of a
territory rather than only a part of it. Full information and rational decisionmaking, however, should surpass such gambling. Instead, the two nations should agree to a deal that divides a resource in proportion to their
objective chances of prevailing in a conflict.
With full information, two states in a dispute should reach a settlement
rather than turn to armed hostilities. If both sides know the expected values
of going to war, they can simply divide the resource based on the differences
in their probability of winning. They will receive the expected benefit of any
conflict but avoid the expected cost. One condition that might prevent an
agreement, however, is if the two countries place greatly different values on
the resource in question. War, in the words of Powell, becomes an “inefficiency puzzle.”134 States should almost always reach a settlement and avoid
the costs of war. But because of international anarchy, they do not; the absence of a supranational government inhibits cooperation by making it difficult for states to overcome information asymmetries. The most important of
these asymmetries involves the variables that contribute to a nation’s
probability of winning a conflict. Some of these factors may appear in the
public domain, such as economic size and growth, defense budgets, and military capacity, but others will fall primarily within the knowledge of a single
state.135
These asymmetries produce several problems. First, imperfect information will lead to mistakes in bargaining.136 If states overestimate their expected benefits—and correspondingly underestimate their opponent’s—
they will fail to realize that there is a broader range for agreement and may
choose to go it alone instead of seeking union.
Second, states will have an incentive to conceal their true expected benefits from an agreement.137 A party might seek to conceal its abilities in order
to take advantage of the other party. Or it might seek to exaggerate its resources in order to bluff its way to a better deal.
Third, states will have few ways to reveal private information.138 In order
to reach an agreement, a state should disclose its true capabilities. This picture will allow the parties to judge more accurately the expected benefits for
each side, which should smooth the way to a settlement. But under conditions of anarchy, the parties will have difficulty revealing private information
132.
179.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Fearon, supra note 127, at 380–81; Powell, Commitment Problem, supra note 127, at
Powell, Commitment Problem, supra note 127, at 179.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 172–76.
Fearon, supra note 127, at 393–95.
Id. at 395–400.
Id. at 400–01.
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in a credible manner. Historical, ethnic, or religious tensions may also make
groups doubt others’ credibility. One group that may have suffered at the
hands of a government dominated by the other group may believe that deception is at work. Unlike in the case with domestic litigation, states cannot
reveal information through a third party—such as a federal court—that will
provide certainty about the information’s accuracy.
Even if states could overcome these informational asymmetry problems,
the anarchy of the international system creates a second, more difficult obstacle to cooperation. Full information would allow each party to identify
the range of outcomes where both parties benefit and where an acceptable
distribution of the surplus of cooperation is achievable. But even with perfect information, states may still refuse to reach a peaceful settlement because of the lack of future enforcement mechanisms. They may understand
that they both will be better off by sharing a territory or resource. But nations may not trust each other to abide by the agreement in the future. This
problem will prove particularly acute in situations where a settlement
changes the status quo between states, where rapid changes are already affecting the balance of power, or where parties are more concerned with relative gains than absolute gains.139 One nation will find it difficult to trust the
other to keep a promise if the other will become even more powerful as a
result of the agreement.
Suppose, for example, that at the time the North and South decide to
unify, the North holds 55% of the power and the South retains 45%. They
agree to establish institutions that give the North a 55–45% advantage in
political power to mirror the existing balance. But suppose that the North’s
55% advantage in power will grow over time to 65% because the North’s
population and economy are expected to grow faster than the South’s. It will
be difficult for the South to trust the North to keep its original commitment
to a 55–45 division of power when the North could eventually take advantage of the relative shift in resources in the future to seek even greater gains
in political power. The North will have a strong incentive to renege on its
deal and pursue a revision of the initial terms. No higher political power can
force the North to keep its original promise, even when both North and
South have complete information at the time of the agreement.
A constitution may present an opportunity for the North and South to
send costly signals that demonstrate their credibility. As scholars of bargaining theory have argued, a costly signal can help reveal that a party will keep
its commitment. In international politics, for example, a nation can send a
costly signal that it will defend an ally by stationing large military assets in
its ally’s territory. A party to a private contract can send a costly signal by
investing in equipment that has value only if the party completes the deal. In
the context of national unification, one group can send a costly signal that it
intends to keep its promises by agreeing to a constitution that freezes its
political power. In the U.S. Constitution, for example, the North agreed to a
139. Powell, Commitment Problem, supra note 127, at 171–72.
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structure of government that allowed the states greater sway than a parliamentary democracy would have permitted and thus gave the South an advantage. This sent a costly signal to the South that the North would keep its
promises on issues that fell within the jurisdiction of the federal
government.
Originalism can help overcome the obstacles to bargaining in two ways.
First, it represents another way for the North, in our example, to show its
commitment to keeping its political promises. While the constitution embodies an agreement to share political power, the weaker parties may choose
not to enter the nation until they are confident that the more powerful parties will keep their promises to share power along the original terms. Interpretation creates another source of disagreement. Parties may worry that
others will seek to renegotiate the deal in their favor once they become more
powerful thanks to the union. Interpretation may create an opportunity for
the more powerful states to break their commitments, and this very possibility may discourage weaker states from agreeing to a union in the first place.
Originalism, of course, signals a commitment to the original terms of the
deal; its very purpose is to follow the understandings of only those who
ratified the constitution. It can help reassure weaker states that interpretation will not serve as a covert means to break the original agreement of
union.
In addition, originalism can serve as a costly signal in itself. It not only
reassures the parties to the constitution that each of them is committing to
the political deal of the union; it is also an expensive means of interpretation
that will prevent the more populous states from having their way through
majority rule. To the extent that originalism prevents even marginal changes
in constitutional understandings, it will work to the disadvantage of the
growing states, which would otherwise be able to alter future arrangements
to their advantage through simple majority rule. Originalism may not be the
best way, from a normative perspective, to interpret the constitution, but it
serves a critical purpose by persuading parties to a political union that they
can trust each other to keep their promises. From this perspective, originalism would be critical to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution itself.
We need not limit our suggestion about originalism only to structural,
power-sharing features of the Constitution. Originalism might contain an
important element of aspects of the Constitution’s individual rights provisions, such as the Reconstruction Amendments. We can regard these amendments as the peace agreement at the end of the Civil War: the North would
allow the South to reenter the Union as long as it provided equal political
rights for newly freed slaves. As our analysis has shown, the North and
South might have good information on the benefits to both regions of restoring the Union as well as the costs to the South of remaining occupied
and outside the federal government. But an obstacle to the bargain would
still arise. The North might lack confidence that the South would keep its
promise to respect the rights of the freedmen. After all, the South had just
fought and lost a war to defend its right to maintain the system of slavery.
Of course, one way for the South to show its commitment was by ratifying
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the Reconstruction Amendments, which would give the promise of equal
rights the force of law. Agreeing to an originalist interpretation, which
would look to the understandings of the Reconstruction Congress, would
send another costly signal about the South’s commitment to obeying the
bargain over its reentry into the Union. In this case, originalism would not
embody a power-sharing agreement but instead would work to expand individual rights. After the controversy over the 1876 elections, multiple and
successive presidential administrations and Congresses reneged on the Reconstruction Amendments’ political agreement. One of the many tragedies
of Plessy v. Ferguson140 was that it ignored the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s text in favor of contemporary, unwritten notions
of constitutional meaning.
Conclusion
As Amar’s readers have come to expect from him, he has produced a
tour de force. His book abounds in fertile and ingenious arguments, its lively
enthusiasm for the Constitution is contagious, and the writing is at once
erudite and accessible. Although this work does not stand on the level of
Amar’s earlier book, it remains a signal accomplishment in constitutional
legal theory.
Nonetheless, the book contains a deep flaw. As Amar’s narrative unfolds, it becomes clear that his “unwritten” Constitution deviates widely
from the original Constitution. Amar’s unwritten Constitution is a Panglossian Constitution, perfectly reconfigured to align with current ideals and
policy preferences. This leads to strange anomalies in a work that is otherwise so attentive to history. Thus, Amar can argue that “the original Constitution . . . seemed to condemn a legalized racial hierarchy”—at least if one
reads the Bill of Attainder Clause “generously, with idealistic attention to
both letter and spirit” (p. 144). Alas, this tendency to idealize is pervasive
throughout the work.141
Among its many surprises, Unwritten explores a new direction for
originalism. In Amar’s eclectic form, originalism is not confined to constitutional text, framing intention, ratification discourse, and early postadoption
practice. He extends the range of legitimate interpretive material to encompass a vast array of sources, including the political and social forces that
influenced the text’s original adoption and those that are currently mobilized in favor of certain interpretations of it. Historical contingencies that
surrounded the ratification of one clause are taken as interpretative clues to
the meaning of another. Thus, for example, the presence of the Union Army
140. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
141. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1561–62; see also Randy Barnett, The Mirage of Progressive Originalism, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 2012, at C7 (reviewing Unwritten), available at http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444914904577619763983330558 (“Where Mr.
Amar cannot make the written Constitution say what he wants, he can simply appeal to the
unwritten Constitution to say the rest. And, judging from this book, the unwritten Constitution just happens to agree with everything Akhil Reed Amar believes is right and good.”).
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in the South during the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment becomes
an argument for the constitutionality of the draft.142 But the principles that
guide Amar’s choice of sources and his selection of relevant materials are
unstated and thus lack coherent and discernible limits.
We suggest that a return to a more austere and “original” understanding
of originalism would avoid such problems. To be sure, contemporary
originalism has undergone searching criticisms since it was advanced in the
1970s. But it has also found capable and sophisticated defenders, and it has
proven remarkably resilient through a succession of reformulations. Its normative effects, however, remain controversial. Why should the original
meaning of the Constitution presumptively decide current interpretations of
it? And what if an interpretation that is true to the original meaning simply
fails to answer a question that calls for constitutional construction?
Originalists can offer a variety of answers to these normative questions.
They can point to the framing and ratification of the Constitution and contemporary beliefs about the government’s legitimacy as rooted in these origins. Or they can offer a more pragmatic, less historical justification by
highlighting the desirable consequences of following the Constitution’s original meaning and the risks of departing from that understanding when the
formal rules for amendment are not followed. Or they can make both kinds
of arguments at once. We have advanced a different approach here. By encouraging fidelity to the original bargain that created and renewed the
Union, originalism can help to keep that Union alive and well.

142. For criticisms, see Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1400–01, and Strauss, supra note 5, at
1553.
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